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I. INTRODUCTION
Should there be a formal connection, that is, a legal link as well
as closer political and operational relationships, between the United
Nations and certain regional institutions at work in the international
peace and security field, particularly between the United Nations and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? This Article ex-
amines both the theoretical merits of the idea of formalized
U.N.-NATO cooperation of some kind and the likelihood of forming
such an "alliance" of these hitherto unconnected, and quite different,
organizations. It does so in the context of a broader, more systemic
question: Could a U.N.-NATO relationship and other such imagin-
able relationships between the United Nations and other regional or-
ganizations, taken together, although each is likely to remain sui
generis in some respects, be forged into a more unified and coherent
international security structure?1 Could regional arrangements or
agencies including NATO become, in the graphic language used by
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg during the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Organization at San Francisco in 1945, "king-
links" in a "global chain"?2
The limitations of the United Nations as the sole global
* Associate Professor of Diplomatic History and Director of The Fletcher Roundtable
on a New World Order, The Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts University; Affiliate, The
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
1. For an elaboration of the history and issues involved in this question, see Alan K.
Henrikson, The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations, in
REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLrITcS: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 122-68 (Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell eds., 1995).
2. Calculated Risk, in THE PRiVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 337, 366
(Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. ed., 1952).
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peacekeeper are becoming more and more evident as the hopefulness
of that organization at the end of the Cold War gives way to a more
realistic appreciation of the intractability of many of the problems
with which the United Nations must deal. The United Nations' own
deficiencies as an institution are compounded by deficits in the sup-
port given it by the United States and other countries, most notably
in their failure to meet peacekeeping cost assessments. As a result,
the United Nations, underfunded, overcommitted, and overstrained,
has begun to withdraw from the peacekeeping field, in some cases
transferring its authority to other entities, including regional organi-
zations.
The most remarkable case in point, possibly indicative of a fu-
ture trend, was the Transfer of Authority (TOA) on December 20,
1995, from the Commander of the U.N. Peace Forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces South-
ern Europe, who was mandated by the North Atlantic Council and
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to lead a U.N.-approved but
non-U.N. military force to carry out the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace
Agreement. With this action, a U.N.-directed multilateral operation,
the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), was succeeded by an alli-
ance-based multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), "under the
command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN."4
The distinction between "multilateral" and "multinational" is
crucial to the argument advanced in this Article. It may be explained
as follows: The "multinationalization" of international peace opera-
tions-meaning their takeover either by regionally based military al-
liances or by individual great powers plus selected smaller countries
within traditional spheres of influence, often regionally defined-
must be kept within the ambit of the United Nations Organization in
order not to degenerate into hegemonic domination and exploitation.
Such degeneration can be avoided by ensuring that peace operations
are conducted "multilaterally," meaning that when great powers and
their allies contribute forces, they do so in an organized way and un-
der a supervisory authority.5 Multilateralism can be encouraged by
3. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The U.S. Must Pay Its Dues, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 1996, at
A15; Don't Capsize the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, April 1,1996, at A16.
4. Fact Sheet: Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
DISPATCH 24 (Supp. 5, 1995); see generally Chris Scheurweghs, IFOR-Fact Sheet (July 26,
1996) (on file with Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law; available on internet
NATODATA list through <scheurwe@hq.nato.int>).
5. See further discussion infra text accompanying note 71.
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(1) the constraint of reciprocity, or the mutual apprehension and ex-
changed regard between regional organizations or alliances; and by
(2) the negotiation of more explicit, formalized bonds between re-
gional power groupings and the United Nations Organization, par-
ticularly through, it is suggested here, the conclusion of "special
agreements" to make available to the U.N. Security Council armed
forces, assistance, and facilities as provided for and required by the
as-yet-unused Article 43 of the U.N. Charter.6 By the conclusion of
such agreements, and the closer liaisons that would result, the mili-
tary action of regional organizations or alliances within regions, oth-
erwise independent of wider international authority, could be
"re-multilateralized," with benefits for international comity.
To ground this argument on a firm understanding of the interna-
tional-organizational and diplomatic history of the issue of global-
regional action in the peace and security field, Part II of this Article
presents a brief "constitutional" analysis of the problem in the con-
text of the U.N. Charter as it has evolved, followed by a review of the
pattern of global-regional organizational relations during the Cold
War, in Part III. With the end of that era, major new possibilities of
international cooperation in regional peace-and-security mainte-
nance have emerged. Part IV of this Article, on post-Cold War
peacekeeping relations, discusses these new possibilities, emphasizing
the principle of reciprocity as a positive guideline in a "mixed" multi-
national and multilateral order. A particularly important case in the
context of the argument offered here is that of Haiti. The interna-
tional intervention in Haiti in September 1994 will be analyzed, po-
litically as well as legally, for the lessons that it may hold for multilat-
eral-multinational cooperation in other regions, including the
geopolitically sensitive sphere of the former Soviet Union. This dis-
6. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter states:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council,
on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance
to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initia-
tive of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council
and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be
subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective con-
stitutiona processes.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43, paras. 1-3.
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cussion is followed in Part V by a short presentation of the pertinent
views of U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on possible methods
of harnessing regional energies in the global interest-outlined ini-
tially in his 1992 report to the Security Council, An Agenda for
Peace.7 Finally, a concluding Part VI considers the types of formal-
ized links, including Article 43 special agreements, which might be
established, particularly by NATO allies with the U.N. Security
Council, for the better concatenation of global and regional peace-
and-security efforts.
II. THE ACCOMMODATION OF REGIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE U.N. CHARTER
The legal framework of global-regional cooperation is the U.N.
Charter's Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements.8 Chapter VIII
records an international consensus regarding global-regional rela-
tionships that was formulated, though not fully worked out, at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference in late 1944 and at the San Francisco
Conference concluding in June the following year.9 The new United
Nations Organization was intended to be the paramount world insti-
tution." Nonetheless, three "fundamental concessions," as Francis 0.
Wilcox has characterized them, were made to the idea of regionalism
and region-based peacemaking in order to give a regional entity
"elbowroom to deal with local disputes in the first instance" and
make it less necessary for the United Nations itself to become in-
volved."
The first concession, stated in Article 33(1) of Chapter VI on the
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, was the provision that parties to any
dispute endangering international peace and security "shall, first of
all, seek a solution by ... resort to regional agencies or arrange-
7. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIvE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-
KEEPING: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 (1995), U.N. Sales No.
E.95.I.15 (1995).
8. See generally Henrikson, supra note 1, at 125-129.
9. See Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Military
Operations: The Past and Present, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 7-15 (1996).
10. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter unequivocally states: "In the event of a conflict be-
tween the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail."
11. Francis 0. Wilcox, Regionalism and the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN
THE BALANCE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS 425, 427 (Norman J. Padelford & Leland
M. Goodrich eds., 1965).
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ments," by direct negotiation, third-party mediation, arbitration, or
by some other means of their own choosing. Chapter VIII on Re-
gional Arrangements states that nothing in the Charter is to preclude
"the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action."' 2 Chapter VIII fur-
ther declares that U.N. members "entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or
by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security
Council."13 Such regional efforts to maintain peace thus were, at least
in principle, actively promoted by the U.N. Organization, without
derogating from the independent right of the Security Council to in-
vestigate peace-threatening situations14 or the right of any country,
even a non-U.N. member, to bring a local situation directly to the at-
tention of the Organization, either to the Security Council or to the
General Assembly. 5
The second concession to regionalism was the allowance in the
Charter for the continued operation of existing mutual assistance
pacts, including the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance against
Nazi Germany and its European associates 6 and the Four-Nation
Declaration signed in Moscow in October 1943."7 Article 53(1) of
Chapter VIII declares that measures against "enemy states," defined
in Article 53(2) as those that during the Second World War had been
enemies of any Charter signatory, could be taken immediately, with-
out prior authorization by the Security Council, in accordance with
Article 107 in Chapter XVII on Transitional Security Arrange-
ments. These measures could continue until the United Nations it-
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
14. Id. art. 34 (providing that "[t]he Security Council may investigate any dispute ... in
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.").
15. Id. art. 35, para. 1 (stating in part that "[a]ny Member of the United Nations may bring
any dispute ... to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly."). Para-
graph 2 of Article 35 allows for non-member States to bring disputes before the Security Coun-
cil or the General Assembly. See id. art. 35, para. 2.
16. Treaty for an Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates In
Europe, May 26, 1942, U.K.-U.S.S.R., T.S. 2(1942), Cmd. 6376; P. (1941-2) IX 641; 144 B.S.P.
1038; 204 L.N.T.S. 353.
17. Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Nov. 1, 1943, U.S.-U.S.S.R.-U.K.-
R.O.C., 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. 749,755-56 (1943).
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 107 (confirming that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall invali-
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self assumed responsibility which, as the wording of Article 106 in
Chapter XVII suggests, " might not be possible if the aforementioned
Article 43 special agreements" making armed forces, assistance, and
facilities available to the Security Council, for its use, had not already
been negotiated and implemented. Article 53(1) explicitly states that
these measures of immediate enforcement against former enemy
states might result from "regional arrangements directed against re-
newal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state." Arguably,
these transitional-period provisions still hold today, although the pas-
sage of over fifty years and common political sense would make it
unwise, certainly, to invoke them specifically against Germany, Italy,
or Japan.21 The particular point to be made here is the Charter's rec-
ognition of a right of pre-emptive enforcement action under
"regional arrangements," including alliances.
The third and, in its consequences and present meaning, the
most important concession to regionalism was the signatories' recog-
nition via Article 51 at the end of Chapter VII (Action With Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggres-
sion) of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence."
This right, which as "inherent" is natural or inalienable and not time-
bound, could be exercised regionally, or in any other way. Article 51
usually has been understood to allow for treaties of mutual assistance
date or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been
an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by
the Governments having responsibility for such action.").
19. Id. art. 106 (stating that "Pending the coming into force of such special agreements
referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise
of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties [to the Four-Nation Declaration and France]
shall... consult with one another... with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organiza-
tion as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.").
20. See supra note 6.
21. Cf. David J. Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 101, 108 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991)
(asserting that Article 106 of the Charter, "a flexible document," continues to be relevant).
Scheffer comments that
Article 106 provides a rather convenient method by which a multinational force of the
character which was deployed during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis could take enforcement
action deployed under the direction of the great powers, which could have reached a
decision outside the Security Council to use force against Iraq in conformity with the
U.N. Charter and on behalf of the United Nations.
Id. A more historical reading of Article 106 and the Declaration of the Four Nations on Gen-
eral Security signed in Moscow would relate Chapter XVII on Transitional Security Arrange-
ments more tightly to the circumstances following the Second World War. For the diplomatic
history of the Moscow Four-Nation Declaration, see HERBERT FEIS, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT,
STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED AND THE PEAE THEY SOUGHT 207-17 (1957).
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for the purpose of collective self-defense. ' There is no reason why
these defensive pacts, even though Chapter VII does not mention re-
gionalism or regional entities, could not be among the "regional ar-
rangements" referred to in Article 52 at the beginning of Chapter
VIII. Article 53(1) of the latter chapter contains the otherwise lim-
iting (except for the previously assured Article 51 autonomous right
of self-defense) provision that the Security Council "shall, where ap-
propriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for en-
forcement action under its authority." It states further that, except
for anti-enemy state measures, which could be virtually automatic,
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council .... ."" However, despite this requirement of Security Coun-
cil authorization, regional groupings constituted as alliances, such as
NATO, using Article 51 could not be so constrained.
The early examples of regionally based, though not formally
"regional" mutual defense pacts were the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance completed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the Brus-
sels Pact of 1948 centered on Western Europe, and, as noted, the
22. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 792-96 (1950) (emphasizing the autonomy of Article 51 organiza-
tions). Article 5 of the April 4, 1949, treaty on which NATO is based provides for action "in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244,
34 U.N.T.S. 243,246. During the approval process of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Canadian
External Affairs Minister, Lester B. Pearson, wrote:
It would be difficult to maintain successfully, and therefore perhaps unwise to main-
tain at all, that the proposed treaty does not in important respects contemplate a re-
gional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter 8 of the Charter. Article 52(1) de-
fines 'regional arrangements and agencies' in terms which seem clearly applicable to
the arrangements and agencies contemplated under the new treaty.... However, I
think that, by clear intendment, the governing article of the Charter is Article 51 and
that nothing in Chapter 8 or elsewhere in the Charter impairs or restricts, or could be
construed as impairing or restricting, the unqualified and inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. In other words, reading the rele-
vant sections together, there is no real difficulty with the second sentence of Article
53(1).
Telegram EX-677 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassa-
dor to the United States (Mar. 14, 1949), in 15 DOCuMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL
RELATIONS, 1949, at 585 (Hector Mackenzie ed., 1995). Pearson added that Leo Pasvolsky,
Special Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State, when being cross-examined on the U.N. Char-
ter by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke as follows of Article 51: "'The word
'collective' relates in part to the regional arrangements that I have just described, but it relates
also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of self-defence.' Therefore, in our
view, regional arrangements can take collective defense measures under Article 51 without any
authorization from the Security Council." Id. at 586.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
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North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty of 1949 which was transatlantic
as well as Western European in strategic scope.' All of these agree-
ments for common defense refer to Article 51, and thus can be said to
avoid the constraints on "regional arrangements or agencies" of
Chapter VIII, and perhaps even the more general limitations im-
posed by the Charter on the resort to force by U.N. members viewing
their own and their allies' vital interests.'
The international order that emerged from the Second World
War delicately balances an individual U.N. member country's right of
self-defense, whether exercised alone or in concert with other U.N.
members of similar interest and outlook and perhaps region, and the
prerogatives of the Security Council in preserving peace and security.
Neither, according to the terms and implications of the Charter, is
unmistakably supreme, and therefore competition has been engen-
dered. The Charter itself imposed no system for enabling the world
and regional organizations to function together and to act jointly. At
the San Francisco Conference, Senator Vandenberg had asserted
hopefully that "we have found a sound, a practical formula for put-
ting regional organizations into effective gear with the global institu-
24. Both U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin made public statements to the effect that the arrangement based on the North Atlantic
Treaty was not a regional organization within the meaning of Article 52 in Chapter VIII of the
U.N. Charter. See Richard H. Heindel et al., The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States
Senate, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 638-39 (1949). See E. N. van Kleffens, the Dutch ambassador to
the United States, did openly consider the Atlantic Pact to be a regional arrangement, how-
ever. E. N. van Kleffens, Regionalism and Political Pacts With Special Reference to the North
Atlantic Treaty, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1949); see also Alan K. Henrikson, The Creation of the
North Atlantic Alliance, in AMERICAN DEFENSE PoLICY 296-320 (John F. Reichart & Steven
R. Sturm eds., 1982) (discussing the making and early history of the Atlantic pact).
25. An often-overlooked qualification in Article 51 is the provision that the right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense can be exercised "until the Security Council has taken meas-
ures necessary to maintain international peace and security," at which point the active need for
self-defensive measures, presumably, no longer would exist. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The fact
that the Security Council may be seized of an issue cannot by itself, of course, warrant a re-
quirement that countries' Article 51 self-defensive measures must immediately be suspended.
A U.N. takeover of responsibility would have to be seen actually to be working, i.e., actually
maintaining international peace and security. Whether the Security Council's measures are
adequate or not is a question that obviously would leave much room for national judgment.
Hans Kelsen observes:
It probably was not the intention of the legislator to confer upon the attacked state the
power to decide whether the measures taken by the Security Council are adequate.
His idea was probably that a state is allowed to exercise its right of self-defence until
the Security Council has taken the measures which the Security Council deems neces-
sary to restore peace. But this idea is nbt unambiguously expressed in Article 51.
Kelsen, supra note 22, at 803.
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tion.2' What he meant specifically was that Article 51, with its ex-
press recognition of the right of collective self-defense, permitted
formation of a regionally based inter-American security arrange-
ment, the Rio Treaty, which would preserve America's freedom of
action under the Monroe Doctrine. This U.S.-controlled mechanism
would be meshed with the larger U.N. system only nominally. He
and many other U.S. policymakers then placed their main reliance on
regional initiative, capacity, and action. Concluding, however that
the world organization would be "infinitely strengthened" by enlist-
ing "the dynamic resources of these regional affinities," Vandenberg
proclaimed: "We weld these regional king-links into the global
chain. ,
27
III. GLOBAL-REGIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE COLD
WAR
This loosely constituted arrangement was intended by its design-
ers to enable the United Nations and existing and future regional
bodies to work, at least theoretically, in unison. Despite the roomi-
ness of the U.N. Charter structure, considerable tension subsequently
developed between the global institution and regional entities
through competing claims in the Charter. As discussed earlier, Arti-
cles 33(1) and 52(2) seem to allow regional agencies priority of action
with regard to managing disputes of essentially a "local" character;2
however, Articles 34 and 35,29 together with the powerful general
Charter authorizations of Articles 24 and 39,' appear to give the
United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, the pre-
eminent role in world peacekeeping and peacemaking. Article 103,
though making the supremacy of the United Nations explicit, does
not clarify the actual global-regional balance of obligations. 3' The
26. THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG, supra note 2, at 366.
27. Id.
28. See text accompanying notes 12-13, supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 14-15, supra.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1 (stating that the "Members [of the United Nations]
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security ... ."); U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (providing that "[t]he Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
31. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states in its entirety that "[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreements, their obligations under the present
1996]
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:35
vagueness of this division of responsibility between the global organi-
zation and regional groupings has conditioned the history of all sub-
sequent dealings between them.
During most of the Cold War period, the world organization and
regionally based bodies, rather than growing closer in conformity
with the lines of development generally suggested by the U.N. Char-
ter, tended to grow apart. The Korean War provided the first serious
test of the cohesiveness of the global chain. The United Nations Se-
curity Council, owing to the temporary absence of the Soviet Union's
representative, called for withdrawal of the North Korean invaders
and "recommended" that member states furnish such assistance as
may be needed in order to repel the North Korean attack. 2 It was
necessary for the Security Council to "recommend," as there were
then no Article 43 forces for it to order into the field in Korea, or
anywhere else. The return to the Council of Soviet Ambassador
Jakov Malik, who could exercise a veto, made it necessary to turn to
the General Assembly, which also had a basic responsibility for peace
and security under the Charter and which could decide important
questions by a two-thirds majority. The U.S. representative there
proposed that member states earmark troops for U.N. use, pending
the conclusion of Article 43 special agreements, so that the organiza-
tion might be given the means to maintain international peace and
security.3 Adopting this proposal, known as the Acheson Plan or,
formally, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, the General Assembly
recommended that "each [U.N.] Member maintain within its national
armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they
could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units."' The
Uniting for Peace Resolution also established a Collective Measures
Committee which, after learning of the resources and plans of the
members, would make a report on methods "which might be used to
maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accor-
dance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account
of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and
52 of the Charter)."'35 At that time, it was only the North Atlantic
Charter shall prevail."
32. U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.474 (1950).
33. See WILLIAM R. FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 57-58 (1957).
34. G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
35. Id.; see also DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT 450 (1969).
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Alliance that had the capacity to act regionally, if not beyond the
treaty-defined North Atlantic area.
The globally-oriented multilateral and regionally-oriented, great
power-focused multinational principles here were balanced uneasily,
with the United States reluctant to commit itself primarily to the one
or the other. The U.S.-dominated "Unified Command" in Korea, an
international though not fully internationalized or true U.N. com-
mand structure, did not set a permanent pattern for subsequent in-
ternational military organization. Nonetheless, the "Unified Com-
mand" precedent was suggestive of a way of compromising
multilateralism and multinationalism so as to preserve the advan-
tages of both, the collectivism of the former and the voluntarism of
the latter.
In its reply to the General Assembly's request for its plans to
meet the expectations of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the
United States government, in what has been described as "a model of
skillful obfuscation" stated that "in appropriate circumstances, pur-
suant to the [North Atlantic] Treaty and the Charter," and "in accor-
dance with due constitutional processes," American forces
"maintained in furtherance of the Treaty" could "participate in col-
lective measures to maintain or restore peace and security in the
North Atlantic area in support of United Nations action," i.e., "if the
United States chose to go to war in the NATO area, its NATO troops
would be happy to let themselves be called U.N. troops."36 The sig-
nificance of actually placing a U.N. imprimatur on a major NATO
operation in the European theater, such as the later 1995-96 "Joint
Endeavor" operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina would show, could be
considerable, for doing so made a powerful regional action interna-
tionally more legitimate.
After Korea, there occurred a kind of crossover of regionalism
and universalism. NATO, in particular, assumed a major responsi-
bility for maintaining international security, even well outside its
sphere." The United Nations, denied its proper central world peace-
36. FRYE, supra note 33, at 59.
37. On the broad geographical scope of political consultation, if not military action, under
the North Atlantic Treaty, see SIR NICHOLAs HENDERSON, THE BIRTH OF NATO 100-05
(1983). On NATO's extended influence, see generally Alan K. Henrikson, The North Atlantic
Alliance as a Form of World Order, in NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND
ARcHTEcruRE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY 111-35 (Alan K. Henrikson ed., 1986); ELIZABETH
SHERWOOD, ALLIES IN CRISIS: MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO WESTERN SECURITY
(1990).
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enforcement role by the superpower division within it, assumed, faute
de mieux, the useful but marginal role of keeping the local peace
whenever cease-fires and truces could be worked out, usually in po-
litically non-central regions. This result was not what the Charter
authors had intended. "Peacekeeping" was in fact an improvisation
of the United Nations-in the words of a former U.N. official in
charge of the peacekeeping function, it was "discovered, like penicil-
lin."38
The few strictly Chapter VIII-based regional organizations (as
distinct from regionally based alliances) played a much smaller role
than the authors of the Charter had planned. These were, principally,
the League of Arab States (LAS) and the subsequently formed Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) and Organization of African
Unity (OAU).39 These organizations were not used either as "shock
absorber" or as "forum of first resort"-at least by the leadership of
the U.N. Organization-because of the regionals' own weaknesses
and because the strength, authority, and credibility of the U.N. Secu-
rity Council also had not adequately been built up. There was an un-
fulfilled need for greater interdependence and synergistic action be-
tween the two levels of organization. "One can only hazard a guess,"
speculated Francis Wilcox twenty years after San Francisco, "but in
all likelihood if the Security Council had been able to discharge effec-
tively its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, many more dis-
putes of a local character would have been settled at the regional
level."4
The previous successes or failures of the United Nations and re-
gional organizations to work together may shed light on the question
of whether regional arrangements for peace and security can be the
"king-links," or the strong major components, of a "global chain," an
integrative worldwide system of cooperative action. The global-
regional story during most of the Cold War era was mainly one of in-
38. Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeep-
ing, in NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER, supra note 37, at 62.
39. More recently, following the Cold War and the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and also the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have declared themselves to be regional organiza-
tions in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter. See Victor-Yves Ghebali, The July CSCE
Helsinki Decisions -A Step in the Right Direction, NATO REV., August 1992, at 5; Former So-
viet Republics: Ethnic Conflicts, Turmoil Persist; Observer Status Granted to CIS, UN CHRON.,
June 1994, at 36; see also Christopher J. Borgen, The Theory and Practice of Regional Organi-
zation Intervention in Civil Wars, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 797 n.136 (1994).
40. Wilcox, supra note 11, at 431.
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ter-organizational competition, rather than cooperation." In Latin
America, in Africa, in the Middle East, and in Europe too, Cold War
conditions precluded any global-regional bonding. A consequence
was that on neither level, that of the world body or that of the re-
gional entities, could deep and true, as well as widely acceptable,
peace settlements easily be made. There was constant mutual inter-
ference.
Let us consider the proposition that effective regional action for
peace depends on mutually responsible peace-maintenance by the
U.N. Security Council, and vice-versa, region by region. The primor-
dial international-legal formulation of the international status of re-
gional relationships or associations concerns the Western Hemi-
sphere (and indeed, by implication, all other geopolitical regions to
this day). That formula is Article 21 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration
or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the
maintenance of peace."42  In effect, the Covenant acknowledged
spheres of interest. Principally out of deference to the non-member
United States, the League generally stayed out of territorial and
other disputes in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, whenever,
later, the United Nations, having the Soviet Union as a member, was
tempted to step into the region, the Organization of American States,
under the sway of the dominant U.S. interest, usually barred the way.
A hemispheric vacuum was thus preserved, which the OAS and the
United States were free to fill. The notion of world order seemed
almost a threat. As an Argentine former OAS Secretary-General,
Alejandro Orfila, stated, "In these circumstances, during the Cold
War between the two superpowers, the vision of regional order in the
Americas gained in attractiveness."43
During the Guatemala crisis in 1954, the Cuban missile crisis of
1962, and the Dominican Republic crisis in 1965, the OAS was the
organizational venue of choice for the U.S. government, promoted by
the United States as virtually a regional surrogate for the United Na-
tions.' In the last of these cases, the Dominican situation, the United
41. See Henrikson, supra note 1, at 134-41.
42. LEAGUE OFNATIONS COVENANT art. 21.
43. Alejandro Orfila, The Organization of American States and International Order in the
Western Hemisphere, in NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER, supra note 37, at 139.
44. For a focused discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis and a general discussion on Gua-
temala and the Dominican Republic, see Abram Chayes, The Legal Case for the U.S. Action on
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Nations for the first time anywhere did dispatch a peace mission
alongside a regional-organizational presence-an OAS mission and
an Inter-American Peace Force. The dissatisfaction of U.N. Secre-
tary-General U Thant with the stronger regional means chosen was
evident in his observing, sharply if without pointed accusation, that
"the developments in the Caribbean should stimulate thought by eve-
ryone concerning the character of the regional organizations and the
nature of their functions and obligations in relation to the responsi-
bilities of the United Nations under the Charter.,
45
Regarding Africa, too, the global-regional balance with respect
to peace and security was tilted in favor of the regional body, the Or-
ganization of African Unity, despite that organization's relative lack
of institutional or physical capacity. Independent-Africa's consensus,
embodied in the 1963 Addis Ababa Charter establishing the OAU,
held that the territorial framework of boundaries drawn by the Euro-
pean colonial powers was not to be changed-an attitude reflecting
anxiety about the possible effects of allowing European or other out-
side forces back in to adjust existing boundaries.46 Resolution of a
Moroccan-Algerian territorial dispute in 1972 according to the status
quo guideline of the OAU Charter helped to establish what has been
called the "Try OAU First" principle The United Nations Organi-
zation did, to be sure, become deeply involved in the civil war in the
Congo in the 1960s, sending peacekeeping units and a reconciliation
commission, although this was a somewhat different category of
problem, centering not on differences over territory but on the basic
question of political and administrative control.48 The United Na-
tions wanted to insulate the Congo as much as possible from the risk
Cuba, 47 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 763-65 (1962); see also ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 41-87 (1974). For a discussion of the Gua-
temala crisis, see generally RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, THE CIA IN GUATEMALA 168-173
(1982). For a discussion of the Dominican Republic crisis, see JOHN B. MARTIN, OVERTAKEN
BY EVENTS: THE DOMINICAN CRISIS FROM THE FALL OF TRUJILLO TO THE CIVIL WAR 438
n.3 (1966) (stating that "[t]he U.N. Charter is ambiguous, setting forth at one point that pri-
mary responsibility for keeping the peace rests with the United Nations but at another point
that primary responsibility rests with regional international bodies. It is standing U.S. policy to
keep inter-American affairs in the OAS.").
45. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS-A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING 208 (2d ed. 1990), U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 [hereinafter THE BLUE HELMETS].
46. See ZDENEK CERVENKA, THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER 93-95,
231-240 (1969).
47. See Berhanykun Andemicael, The Organization of African Unity and the United Na-
tions: Relations in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS
238,254-56 (Berhanykun Andemicael ed., 1979).
48. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 45, at 215-59.
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of great-power intervention and, accordingly, encouraged maximum
African participation. An Ad Hoc Commission of ten OAU mem-
bers under Jomo Kenyatta was formed, but it could not prevent an
American-British-Belgian rescue operation at Stanleyville in No-
vember 1964. The OAU joined in international requests for a meet-
ing of the U.N. Security Council to condemn this extra-regional in-
tervention. Ultimately, the Security Council passed a resolution
placing the problem of peace promotion in the Congo "in the lap of
the OAU."49 The United Nations henceforth sought to stay out of
the situation. The United Nations also refused to be drawn into the
1967-70 Nigerian Civil War, recognizing that the majority of African
countries supported the Nigerian federal government in Lagos rather
than the independence-seeking state of Biafra." Perhaps regional
order triumphed over human justice, but the lines of authority were
clear.
In the Middle East during the Cold War years there was only
limited contact between organized globalism and organized region-
alism for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
The Suez crisis of 1956, though innovative in the stimulus it gave to
the organization of the first United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) and to the involvement in peace-and-security affairs of the
U.N. General Assembly, did not result in close cooperation between
the United Nations and the most pertinent regional body, the League
of Arab States. In May 1958 the President of Lebanon, Camille
Chamoun, appealed to the LAS and then to the United Nations to
put an end to what he deemed foreign intervention in his country-
armed subversives allegedly backed by the newly combined Egyp-
tian-Syrian United Arab Republic. 51 Although the Council of the
Arab League sought exclusive control of the problem, the Lebanese
government exercised its right under Article 35 and went again to the
Security Council. There it obtained, owing to the Soviet Union's ab-
stention, passage of a neutral Swedish resolution calling for the dis-
patch of what became the United Nations Observation Group in
Lebanon (UNOGIL) 2
49. See R. A. AKINDELE, THE ORGANIZATION AND PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE: A
STUDY OF UNIVERSAL-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 98-102 (1976).
50. See U Thant, Secretary-General's Press Conference, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1969,
39-40; AKINDELE, supra note 49, at 102-05; JOHN J. STREMLAu, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970 at 94-95 (1977).
51. See U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess., 818th mtg. at 2,5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.818 (1958).
52. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 45, at 175-85.
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Other situations in which there has been some U.N.-Arab
League interchange, occasionally through the Arab group at the
United Nations, include the Kuwait-Iraq border dispute of 1961, the
civil strife in Yemen in 1962, and, a decade later, a border conflict be-
tween North and South Yemen. In dealing with the first of these,
which was largely managed by Arab diplomacy, an Arab League Se-
curity Force, with some assistance from Great Britain, was organized
and dispatched." At that time the machinery of the U.N. Security
Council was veto-blocked, and the Arab League and British action
probably saved Kuwait.' In 1976 an even larger Arab peacekeeping
force went into Lebanon, increasingly beset by complications result-
ing from the nearby Israeli-Palestinian struggle as well as by its own
internal power struggles.55 The United Nations did not again become
involved there until 1978, when it augmented the Syrian-dominated
Arab regional force with a more widely gathered U.N. Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These precedents in Arab peacekeeping sug-
gest a regional potential, which closer cooperation with the United
Nations would help the Arab countries, together with Israel and
other Middle Eastern nations, fulfill. 6
In Europe and its environs the prime example of institutional-
ized peace-and-security action has been, of course, that of NATO.
Although U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made it plain
that "NATO has not been organized as a regional association, nor
has it any policy or jurisdiction to deal with disputes as between the
members,"57 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, being a political
alliance as well as a military force, actually has at times exercised a
noteworthy peacemaking influence. In late 1956, following the Suez
debacle, which generated inter-allied differences as well as external
rifts, a NATO Committee of Three composed of the foreign minis-
ters of Canada, Italy, and Norway recommended that the Alliance
improve its consultation capabilities." The NATO governments then
reaffirmed their obligation to settle whatever international disputes
53. See DAVID W. WAINHOUSE Er AL., INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE
CROSSROADS: NATIONAL SUPPORT- EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 414-36 (1973).
54. See id.
55. See Hussein A. Hassouna, The League of Arab States and the United Nations: Relations
in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note
47, at 319-321.
56. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 45, at 111-52.
57. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEP'T OF
STATE BULL, No. 884, at 925-26 (1956).
58. See Henrikson, supra note 37, at 125-26.
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they may be involved in only by peaceful means (a U.N. Charter
commitment repeated in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty).59
Moreover, they agreed to submit any internal disputes to good-
offices procedures within their Alliance, "before resorting to any
other agency."' NATO thus could claim organizational priority, if
not jurisdictional supremacy, in the diplomatic as well as the military
field; the United Nations was then scarcely thought of as an alterna-
tive for resolving intra-regional matters.
The major historical achievement of NATO in peacemaking
surely has been its management of Franco-German differences, in-
cluding the issue of control of the Saar.6 NATO institutionally medi-
ated the British-Icelandic "cod war ' 2 and has also moderated the
British-Spanish Gibraltar controversy.' The most notable case of ac-
tive inter-organizational diplomacy by NATO, involving the United
Nations as well, is that of Cyprus. In 1956 the first Secretary-General
of NATO, Britain's Lord Ismay, suggested to the North Atlantic
Council that a committee be formed to mediate the Cyprus conflict,
which deeply split NATO allies Greece and Turkey."4 The eventual
outcome of both organizations' efforts, never well coordinated, was
the establishment in 1964 of the United Nations' Peacekeeping Force
for Cyprus (UNFICYP) and with NATO being relied upon implicitly
to uphold the broader regional geopolitical equilibrium." The Soviet
Union, held on the sidelines, refused to help pay for the U.N. force in
Cyprus, though it was willing to vote for UNFICYP."6 When in 1974
Turkey, responding to appeals from Turkish Cypriots, landed on Cy-
prus with a large-scale armed force and set up a Republic of North-
59. See NATO LETTER, Special Supplement (NATO Information Division, Paris), Jan.
1, 1957, at 8.
60. Id.
61. See NATO LETTER, (NATO Information Division, Paris), July 1,1956, at 23-24.
62. See PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, THE CONTINUING BATrLE: MEMOIRS OF A EUROPEAN,
1936-1966, at 279-80 (1971).
63. See NATO Seen Giving Straits of Gibraltar Control (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, July 8, 1991).
64. See ROBERTS. JORDAN & MICHAEL W. BLOOME, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NATO:
A STUDY IN MULTINATIONAL DIPLOMACY 37 (1979).
65. See LINDA B. MILLER, WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS 116-48 (1967); Karl Th. Birgisson, United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 219-236 (William J. Durch ed. 1993); see also THE BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 45, at 281-311.
66. See Norman J. Padelford, Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis, in THE UNITED
NATIONS IN THE BALANCE, supra note 11, at 95.
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er Cyprus, NATO as an organization, whose own members were
engaged, did not react as it should have done.67 Despite the deadlock
that continues on that island, it at least can be said that the very or-
ganizational structure of NATO, together with its military power and
political influence, has helped to keep the Cypriot situation con-
tained. The story of Cyprus demonstrates, however, that without a
unified, strong, and diplomatically effective United Nations, a re-
gional alliance formation, even one as physically competent as
NATO, cannot transform stability into peace.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IN
A MIXED MULTILATERAL AND MULTINATIONAL ORDER
The end of the Cold War with the ensuing proliferation of ethnic
and other conflicts has made it possible, indeed necessary, for re-
gional organizations and the United Nations to work together-to
cooperate, rather than merely to coexist, and occasionally to coordi-
nate. Although there were signs that both levels of international or-
ganization would then become stronger, there was no clear evidence
that they would join their strengths through closely concerted action.
Some involvement by the United Nations, already seen as the organi-
zation that could best perform the function of "collective legitimiza-
tion, ' obviously was necessary for regional efforts, some of them
quite unprecedented, to be made widely acceptable, as well as effec-
tive locally. In Central America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia, in the
Middle East, and even in highly organized Europe, where deep in-
volvement by the United Nations in peace maintenance was entirely
unexpected, globalism and regionalism could work harmoniously.69
One distinguishing fact of this post-Cold War "new world order"
is the welcome practice, which quickly became habitual, of U.S.-
Soviet/Russian political cooperation within the United Nations sys-
67. See MONTEAGLE STEARNS, ENTANGLING ALLIES: U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE,
TURKEY, AND CYPRUS 68 (1992).
68. See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 87-90 (1967).
69. Many of the conflict situations, including those in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Liberia
and Somalia, Cambodia and Korea, and the former Yugoslavia, are reviewed in Henrikson,
supra note 1, at 142-159. The disproportionality of the overall effort is noted by U.N. Secre-
tariat official Shashi Tharoor:
At the end of the 1980s, few European analysts of international affairs would have
predicted that, at the beginning of 1995, a majority of the peacekeepers deployed by
the United Nations (UN) across the world would be based in Europe, or that the
world organisation would be spending more money on peacekeeping in Europe than
on all other continents put together.
Shashi Tharoor, U.N. Peacekeeping in Europe, SURViVAL, Summer 1995, at 121.
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tem, principally in the Security Council." Although the ideological
struggle and nuclear arms race between the two superpowers is now
largely over, the Cold War still exerts a profound influence. Not only
do Cold War memories persist, but the very structure of international
relations during that long conflict-the basic polarity of world strate-
gic thinking-remains. This element of intercontinental rivalry, even
if perhaps residual, should be seen as a key factor in explaining why
the so-called new world order is developing today more along multi-
national lines rather than along perfectly multilateral lines.
Although future military forces will probably be used more col-
laboratively and, if on a large scale, probably in broad coalitions, it is
not yet possible for them to be used "multilaterally" in the fullest, or
collectivist, sense of that normative as well as descriptive-procedural
word.7' A truly multilateral action must be both conducted organiza-
tionally and governed by broad community principles. More con-
cretely, this means that the action must be not only decided upon by
the United Nations but also carried out or implemented in confor-
mity with the U.N. Charter. Some of its provisions are nearly forgot-
ten. Chapter VII, Article 47 provides for a Military Staff Committee
(MSC) "to advise and assist" the Security Council and also to be re-
sponsible under the Council "for the strategic direction of any armed
forces" placed at its disposal-presumably under the terms of Article
43 special agreements, previously described. "Questions relating to
the command of such forces"-here differentiated from the more
general "strategic direction"--"shall be worked out subsequently."' 2
Article 47(4) also allows the MSC, "with the authorization of the Se-
curity Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agen-
cies," to establish "regional sub-committees." A completely multi-
lateral, or U.N.-conducted, security operation would use all of these
modalities; a multinational operation, regionally based and great
power- or alliance-managed, would not, even though it might have
U.N. approval and be considered consistent with the purposes of the
70. On this and other elements of the "new world order" discerned by U.S. President
George Bush and others, see President Bush, Toward a New World Order, 1 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE DISPATCH 91-94 (1990); see also ALAN K. HENRIKSON, DEFINING A NEW WORLD
ORDER: TOWARD A PRACTICAL VISION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY 10-14 (1991).
71. See John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism.. The Anatomy of an Institution, in MUL-
TILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 6-7 (John
G. Ruggie ed., 1993) (distinguishing between "qualitative" multilateralism and what he terms
"nominal," or merely formal and mechanical, multilateralism).
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 3.
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U.N. Charter.
The difference between multilateral and multinational methods
may be illustrated by examining the diplomatic and military handling
of two geographically specific problems that the United States and
Russia have been confronting: Haiti and Nagorno-Karabakh. Both
the United States and the Russian Federation retain the keenest in-
terest in how the other conducts itself in its own historic security
"sphere". One way for each to contain the other's action is to set an
example for it to follow by acting, in its own sphere, in a spirit of in-
ternational cooperation, that is, by conducting its policies within the
normative framework of the United Nations if not necessarily under
direct U.N. control. This requirement of exemplary behavior, im-
posed legally by the imperatives of the Charter and politically by the
logic of great-power rivalry, will here be called the principle of reci-
procity. This positive guideline may not be sufficiently constraining
any longer, however, despite the Haiti precedent, considered in detail
below. Something of a more formalized, institutionally engaging na-
ture may be needed. A specific proposal, involving the possible use
of Article 43, will be advanced in the concluding section of this Arti-
cle.
The September 1994 military intervention, led by the United
States with prior authorization in July by the Security Council,' to re-
store the democratically elected government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in Haiti may be the prototype for the internation-
ally authorized use of force following but, as noted, not yet wholly
outside the context of the unforgotten Cold War.74 Resolution 940,
which was initiated by U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine K.
Albright,75 takes note of the support given by U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali for "action under Chapter VII of the Charter" in or-
der to assist the legitimate government of Haiti in "the maintenance
of public order." The resolution also recognized "the unique charac-
73. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 940].
74. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE SrruATION IN HAM (1995), U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.11 (summarizing action from a U.N.
institutional perspective).
75. This is regarded as one of Ambassador Albright's signal successes. In July 1994 a State
Department memorandum stated that it would be "folly" to ask the Security Council to
authorize the invasion; Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Perry also were skeptical. But Ambassador Albright told President Clinton, "If I have the
authority, I think I can do it." She did. See Elaine Sciolino, The Foreign Policy Race:
Madeleine Albright's Audition, N.Y. TIMES, September 22,1996,(Magazine), at 86-87.
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ter" of the situation in Haiti, requiring "an exceptional response,"
and noted further that the illegal de facto regime in Haiti had failed
to comply with previous agreements. Resolution 940 concluded:
"[Aicting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,"
the Council "authorizes Member States to form a multinational"-as
distinct from multilateral-"force under unified command and con-
trol"-a preferred U.S. (and also NATO) formulation-"and, in this
framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure
from Haiti of the military leadership." The resolution made clear
that the "cost of implementing this temporary operation" would be
"borne by the participating Member States," not by the United Na-
tions itself.7"
Concomitantly, through Resolution 940, the Security Council
approved an advance team of the already existing U.N. Mission in
Haiti (UNMIH), to establish appropriate means of "coordination"
with the multinational force, to carry out the "monitoring" of the
multinational force, and, because that force's operation would be
temporary, to assess the requirements and prepare an UNMIH de-
ployment upon completion of the force's mission.' The further de-
ployment would occur when "a secure and stable environment" had
been established and UNMIH possessed "adequate force capability
and structure to assume the full range of its functions." 78 In effect,
there would then be a "re-multilateralization" of the effort.
The determination of when to end the multinational force's mis-
sion would be made by the Security Council, "taking into account
recommendations from the Member States of the multinational
force, which are based on the assessment of the commander of the
multinational force, and from the Secretary-General., 79 Effectively,
therefore, there would be a co-decision by the U.S. government,
leading the multinational operation, and by Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali, advising the Security Council. The United Nations
remained nominally responsible. Future steps to be taken in Haiti,
intended to be of a less forcible character, would be multilateral.
During the Security Council's discussion of the two-phased ap-
proach to the Haiti problem outlined in Resolution 940, Ambassador
Albright explained this mixed multinational-multilateral sequenced
76. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 73, at 2.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
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combination of operations that was being planned in comparative
terms:
The resolution before us meshes well with our policy-and that of
the Council-of subjecting proposed new peace operations to rig-
orous review. Phase one builds on the precedents of Kuwait and
Rwanda. Phase two establishes a UN mission of modest size, with a
clear and achievable mandate, operating in a relatively secure envi-
ronment, with the consent of the government, for a finite period of
time.
s°
As her allusions to the American-led operation to rescue Kuwait and
the French-led intervention in Rwanda indicate, What the U.S. gov-
ernment envisioned was a great-power expedition into an area of vi-
tal interest and a sphere of influence." The United Nations, having
invited the use of "all necessary means ' (which it clearly did not it-
self possess), would be carried along, until order was restored.
A further notable feature of the Haiti operation was the compo-
sition of the forces to be involved. "We seek-and anticipate-that
others will join," Ambassador Albright said in speaking to the Secu-
rity Council on behalf of Resolution 940.83 The remarkable fact is
that, despite the intimate interest of the United States in the Haitian
matter and the long and almost hermetic Monroe Doctrine tradition
of excluding outsiders from the Western Hemisphere, her invitation
was extended virtually to the entire world. "My government urges all
governments," she stated, "to contribute appropriately to the prompt
and successful implementation of this resolution. ' 4 This was a major,
indeed radical, break with a legacy of American history-the strong
80. Madeleine K. Albright, Shared Resolve in Restoring Democracy in Haiti, 5 U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE DISPATCH 554,555 (1994).
81. For the U.S. government, the Security Council authorization of military force in the
Persian Gulf area to restore the independence of Kuwait was, in operational terms, a useful
precedent. Security Council Resolution 678, as former U.N. Legal Adviser Oscar Schachter
has pointed out, was remarkably permissive. He notes that
the Council did not decide that the armed forces of the cooperating states were to be
placed at the disposal or under the control of the Security Council. No United Na-
tions command was set up; no reference was made to a United Nations force or to use
of the UN flag. These were features of the UN-authorized force in Korea; their omis-
sion here is further evidence that the Security Council intended to leave the choice of
means, timing, command and control to the participating states.
Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 459-60
(1991).
82. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 73, at 2.
83. Albright, supra note 80, at 555.
84. Id
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U.S. and also OAS preference for keeping the management of hemi-
spheric security affairs regionally contained.'
What is the explanation of this departure? The answer partly
lies, of course, in Washington's wish not to appear, once again, the
Colossus of the North, stepping in to commandeer its Caribbean
sphere. More pertinently in the context of the present discussion of
global-regional and inter-national politics, the Clinton administration
was attempting to establish the informal principle that no other great
power, particularly its erstwhile Cold War adversary, Russia, should
or could have a free hand in intervening in its "area of responsibil-
ity," in the euphemistic language of the 1943 Four-Nation Declara-
tion mentioned in Article 106 of the U.N. Charter's Chapter XVII on
Transitional Security Arrangements."' In other words, if the United
States allowed or even invited "all governments" everywhere in the
world to join it in intervening for peace-restoring purposes in Haiti,
the United States would have an easier time, rhetorically and also
strategically, in advancing the position that the Russian Federation
should accept partners, even from far-away continents, in any multi-
laterally authorized multinational operation in the Caucasus.
Nagorno-Karabakh, a bone of contention between the former
Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, was a particular object
of international concern at the time. Although this was formally an
85. A partial breakthrough of globalism against hemispherism, though in non-security af-
fairs, had occurred during the 1980s with U.S. acceptance of European Community assistance
in supporting political and economic development in Central America and the Caribbean area.
See Marc Pierini, E.C. Eyes New Ties with Central America, EUROPE: MAGAZINE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 30-31; Paget de Freitas, E.C.-Caribbean Links
Seen Growing Stronger, EUROPE: MAGAZINE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 1986, at
24-27,47. For background views on overcoming the preference for regionally managing issues
concerning democracy and law and order in this sensitive region, see THIRD WORLD IN-
STABILITY: CENTRAL AMERICA AS A EUROPEAN-AMERICAN ISSuE (Andrew J. Pierre ed.,
1985).
The later "Friends of Haiti" support group prominently included a European nation,
France, as well as the United States, Canada, and Venezuela, from the Western Hemisphere.
See Meeting of the Friends of Haiti, 4 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 886, 886 (1993). This
recent trend of increasing extra-hemispheric political involvement in the Americas has gone
largely unnoticed by the American public at large. One historically conscious observer who
has noticed it is former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Critical of the U.S. govern-
ment's bringing the United Nations into Haiti, Kissinger points out that in the past Article 51
(individual and collective self-defense) has been the basis of U.S. action, and that the American
position has always been that the regional organization, the OAS, should be used. He laments
that the shift to the U.N. had not been widely discussed. See The Future of the U.S.-U.N. Rela-
tionship: A UNA-USA Conference Transcript, May 21, 1996 at 20-21 (New York: United Na-
tions Association of the United States of America, 1996).
86. See FEIS, supra note 21, at 212.
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inter-state issue, Moscow's emissaries sought to marginalize other
peacemakers. Russia's reassertion of interest in Transcaucasia and
other territories throughout its "near abroad" seemed to foreshadow
a reconstituted Soviet-like system of imperial pacification.' There-
fore a relationship of reciprocity was implicitly sought. The United
States, by refraining from asserting a right to intervene in Haiti by it-
self, or only with other members of the Organization of American
States within its own hemisphere, hoped thereby to deny Russia any
license to act "regionally," alone or with its smaller partners in the
CIS. This was the underlying logic of the unprecedented American
official request for extra-hemispheric partners in the Haitian under-
taking.
It was "no accident," therefore that the countries contributing in
Haiti included, besides the United States and tiny members of the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the geographically remote
Western Hemisphere country of Argentina, the nations, from outside
the Hemisphere altogether, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin,
Denmark, Israel, Jordan, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, the Phil-
ippines, Poland, and the United Kingdom." This laid a basis for the
argument that, should the United Nations ever authorize a military
peacekeeping action in the area of the-former Soviet Union, the Rus-
sians and their Commonwealth of Independent States would have to
accept troops from outside their region, even outside Eurasia, as well.
Although Russia's Permanent Representative on the U.N. Security
Council, Yuli M. Vorontsov, had been strongly condemnatory of the
Haitian military-government leaders, and had voted for the "all nec-
essary means" resolution to remove them,89 the Russian Federation
itself, of course, was not one of the twenty-nine U.N. member coun-
tries sending military troops or police monitors to Haiti. Its doing so
could "invite" U.S. peacekeepers into such places as Nagorno-
Karabakh.
During this same historical period, from July to September 1994,
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali decided that in Bosnia-
87. See Bruce D. Porter & Carol R. Saivetz, The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the
"Near Abroad," WASH Q., Summer 1994, at 75-90; Thomas Goltz, Letter from Eurasia: The
Hidden Russian Hand, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1993,92-116.
88. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Backed on Possible Invasion of Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1994, at A8; see also Background Notes: Haiti, 6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, 494, 494-98
(1995).
89. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Gives Up on Talks to Resolve Haiti Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31,
1994, at AS. The vote on Resolution 940 was 12-0-2 (Brazil and China abstaining). U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413 (1994).
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Herzegovina, as in Haiti, a regionally based international grouping-
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-might take the responsibil-
ity for overseeing whatever peace agreement could be worked out for
that distressed land born of the former Yugoslavia. He made this
suggestion in a communication in July to the members of the
"contact group"-the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and
Germany." The timing strongly suggests that it was the Security
Council's Haiti decision, i.e., to turn that situation over to a U.S.-led
multinational force under a relatively general and open-ended Secu-
rity Council mandate, that set the pattern for the United Nations'
more flexible though not neglectful or unprincipled handling of the
Bosnian problem as well. Regarding Bosnia, too, the logic of politi-
cal reciprocity would determine whether the United States and the
Russian Federation would be able to work, inter-regionally, in the
world's interest.
V. BOUTROS-GHALI AND THE EMERGING
REGIONALISMS
Throughout the years of the post-Cold War period, it has re-
mained the ambition of the United Nations Organization to remain
atop the hierarchy of organizations managing regional problems.
The locus classicus of this view is Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's
An Agenda for Peace.91 During the Cold War, he noted critically,
probably with both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) in mind, "regional organizations worked on occasion against
resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter." With the
end of that struggle, regional organizations could more easily work
together, and with the United Nations.
Accepting that the Charter "provides no precise definition of re-
gional arrangements and agencies," Boutros-Ghali pointed out that it
allows as a result "useful flexibility" for undertakings by state
groupings. Encouraging "a rich variety of complementary efforts,"
the Secretary-General argued against any standard or rigid frame-
work: "Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design
of cooperative work and its division of labour must adapt to the reali-
ties of each case with flexibility and creativity." In this post-Cold
War new era of opportunity,
90. See Lewis, Supra note 89, at As.
91. The following three-paragraph passage is based on AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra
note 7, section VII, paras. 60-65.
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regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their
activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes
and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the
United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed
by Chapter VIII.
Under the Charter, Boutros-Ghali emphasized, "the Security
Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security." But regional organi-
zations should have a larger role. Regional action "as a matter of de-
centralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations ef-
forts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also
contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democ-
ratization in international affairs." Implicitly, he confirmed the in-
creasingly obvious fact that the United Nations was becoming over-
burdened and could no longer afford or otherwise manage to carry
on all the peace operations that were required. He further seemed to
acknowledge that the moral standing of the United Nations, and par-
ticularly that of the Security Council after its authorization of
"Desert Storm" during the Persian Gulf War, was in question and
needed "democratic," including multi-regional, buttressing. Regional
arrangements and agencies, he apparently believed, could help
strengthen the sense as well as the sinews of global community.
How could contributions by regional entities be facilitated?
Boutros-Ghali suggested a number of possible ways, ranging from in-
creased diplomatic communication via the United Nations, to inter-
organizational collaborative measures, to the United Nations actually
designating a regional body to act on its behalf. Every manner of
such cooperation would be beneficial. "Consultations," he noted,
"could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a
problem and the measures required to address it." Members of re-
gional organizations participating "in complementary efforts with the
United Nations in joint undertakings" might encourage other states,
outside their regions, to act in support. "And should the Security
Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or
organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it
would serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity
of the regional effort."
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's subsequent annual Report on
the Work of the Organization of September 1993 noted the enormous
expansion that had taken place in the number and scope of U.N.
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peacekeeping operations and expressed his regret over the difficulty
the U.N. had encountered in securing sufficient manpower and other
assistance.9 In order to deal with the vastly increased demand and
resulting shortages, he recounted steps he had taken, including asking
member states to "designate" qualified personnel for U.N. assign-
ment, setting up a special planning team to define common standards
for equipment and operations, and even authorizing use of the serv-
ices of contractors. He also had instituted a "military planning cell"
in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Na-
tions.93 However, he therein made no comprehensive proposal to
solve what was coming to be known as "The Crisis in Peacekeep-
ing.)94 In particular, he offered no definite, practical plan for drawing
on regional energies.
His 1994 report, Building Peace and Development, however, con-
tained something noteworthy-an account of a meeting he convened
in New York on August 1, 1994, "between the Secretary-General and
the heads of regional organizations, the first meeting of its kind,"95 as
he described it:
The purpose of the meeting was to assess cooperation between the
United Nations and regional arrangements and organizations with a
view to further enhancing it in the future. The meeting was at-
tended by the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Com-
monwealth Secretariat, CSCE, EU, the League of Arab States,
NATO, OAU, OAS, the Organization of the Islamic Conference
and the Western European Union. The Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) was invited but was unable to at-
tend. The participants were in broad agreement that primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
remains with the Security Council. At the same time, participants
acknowledged the desirability of decentralizing some tasks, under a
United Nations mandate. In the view of many delegations, the key
to closer cooperation and coordination between the United Nations
and regional organizations was a smooth and constant exchange of
92. See BouTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., REPORT ON THE
VORK OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM THE FORTY-SEVENTH TO THE FORTY-EIGTH SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 66,102-104 (1993).
93. See id. at 103-04.
94. This phrase was used as the title of a monograph analyzing the potential for U.N.
peacekeeping operations as part of a larger collective security apparatus. ADAM ROBERTS,
THE CluSIS IN PEACEKEEPING (1994).
95. BouTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., BUILDING PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT 1994: REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM THE FORTY-
EIGTH TO THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 258 (1994).
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information on emerging crises at a sufficiently early stage.r
Among the more specific substantive issues discussed were the
training of peacekeeping personnel from regional organizations, co-
ordination of command and control for joint peacekeeping opera-
tions, and coordination of the implementation and verification of
sanctions under Chapter VIIY
In a more public expression of his views, an article in the New
York Times under the title "Beleaguered Are the Peacemakers,"
Boutros-Ghali summarized the U.N. case for increased help from,
and to, regional arrangements and organizations.98 His reasoning
proceeded by quick steps:
The UN invented peacekeeping .... Peacekeeping today has be-
come far more complicated .... These changes require greater in-
volvement of regional organizations and arrangements .... Such
groups can help ease the financial and material burdens placed on
the U.N.... They can provide special insights into conflicts in their
various regions and can sometimes respond more quickly militarily.
The Secretary-General insisted, however, that "unity of com-
mand is essential" lest the different types of U.N.-authorized activity
in a situation damagingly counteract each other. The "new regional-
ism" is a "challenge," as he called it ambivalently:
Regional entities can enhance the efficiency and the effectiveness
of U.N. efforts for peace. Their involvement with the U.N. would
further democratize the international system. But the very features
that make regional entities effective may also make regional in-
volvement seem threatening. Those close to a problem and well
equipped to handle it may also be too close to its living historical
associations: in short, regional involvement may raise the old fears
of regional hegemony and intervention.
These methods of U.N.-regional cooperation must be improved.
We must take care that new regionalism does not become an alter-
native to multilateralism. The resurgence of spheres of influence
96. Id.
97. See id passim. Evidently pleased with this "useful exchange of views," the Secretary-
General expressed his "intention to hold further meetings of this kind." Supplement to An
Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali on the Occasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., para. 85, U.N. Doc.
A/50/60 (1995), reprinted in AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 7.
98. The following paragraphs are based on Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Beleaguered Are the
Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, i994, § 4, at 15.
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and resultant rekindling of old regional hostilities would deal a se-
rious blow to collective security.
VI. A CONCLUDING PROPOSAL
How can the regional hegemonies that Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali fears be reined in? The time has come, it is here pro-
posed, for the unfulfilled Charter commitment of Article 43 that pro-
vides for "special agreements" between the Security Council and
U.N. member states or groups of U.N. member states to be honored.
Special agreements making available armed forces, assistance, and
facilities should be negotiated with the Security Council taking the
initiative prescribed for it in Article 43(3). 9 Such accords may be
crucial to preservation of the global-regional balance that is envi-
sioned in the U.N. Charter. The opportunity presented by the end of
the Cold War may not last indefinitely. Already, there are signs that
the post-Cold War comity in that institution, most visibly in the Secu-
rity Council, is breaking down.'
Through Article 43 agreements, linkages could be formed be-
tween the world body and members of regional bodies that would
both harness the energies of regionally powerful countries, such as
the United States or Russian Federation, and restrain them, pre-
cluding a devolution of the world system into a spheres-of-influence
order, or disorder. The dynamic factor of inter-regional reciprocity,
as seen in the case of Haiti or of Nagorno-Karabakh or prospectively
of Abkhazia, Moldova, or Tajikistan,"'0 may not be, as a purely politi-
cal process and force, sufficient in itself to regulate global-regional
tensions worldwide. Too much would depend on skillful manage-
ment by diplomacy. Not even formal U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions authorizing complementary global-regional efforts which, as
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has pointed out, should encourage
participation by extra-regional states, may suffice to prevent an ex-
cessive tipping of the scales against multilateralism in the handling of
99. See supra note 6.
100. See Russian Block of Security Council Action on Iraq Could Signal New Dynamic of
Far-Reaching Impact, INT'L Docs. REV., Sept. 9, 1996, at 1-2. "Ambassador [Sergey] Lavrov
never used the word veto," said one participant in the consultations regarding the Security
Council's response to the intervention of Iraqi forces in the factional strife among Kurdish fac-
tions in the north. "He merely kept saying that the British draft was not acceptable to his gov-
ernment. But it was a veto he was talking about." Id. at 2.
101. See Elizabeth Fuller, Mediators for Transcaucasia's Conflicts, WORLD TODAY, May
1993, at 89-92.
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local problems. The example of Resolution 940, sometimes viewed
critically as a U.N. "license" for the exercise of military force in Haiti
and, by logical extension, of other "big-power armies" elsewhere, is
an ambiguous legacy.' °0 Article 43 would be a steelier mechanism for
equilibrating the multilateral-multinational balance, it is suggested,
because it would give the Security Council more direct control over
the national forces made available.
Why have Article 43 special agreements never been concluded,
to date? Most of the answer lies in the effects, and aftereffects, of the
Cold War.0 3 Today, however, negotiation of such connective links
should be possible. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali remarked
in An Agenda for Peace, "Under the political circumstances that now
exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-
standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements
should no longer prevail."'3 4 Although some might take the view that
Article 43 "has become a dead letter," that initially vital provision of
the Charter surely is capable of being revived.0 5 Some of the neces-
sary conditions, as noted, have been fulfilled by history itself; the suf-
ficient conditions can be filled through active leadership.
Who might enter into these agreements? Article 43 states that
102 See A U.N. License to Invade Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,1994, at A20.
103. See supra Part III. There have been, of course, technical difficulties as well as ideo-
logical-political impediments to the working out of Article 43 arrangements. Many of the tech-
nical problems are noted in the initial report on the subject of the U.N. Military Staff Commit-
tee, General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the
Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations: Report of the Military Staff Com-
mittee, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., Special Supp. 1 for Apr. 1947, U.N. Doc. S/336 (1947). Such legal
and practical difficulties are cited as sufficient in themselves to warrant abandonment of the
idea of Article 43 agreements, now as well as then, by Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers:
U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEo. L.J. 773 (1993). That the basic rea-
son for the non-realization of Article 43 agreements was the political impasse in East-West re-
lations is attested to, however, by the Soviet government itself, which insisted during the early
talks that members' contributions of armed forces, assistance, and facilities be strictly limited,
in strict detail, by the "principle of equality," rather than by the overall equivalence of contri-
butions. A Soviet representative said in 1947, "I should like to draw the Security Council's at-
tention to the fact that the whole question of armed forces being made available to the Security
Council by the United Nations under special agreements is not only, and not so much, a techni-
cal question as a political one. It is a political problem and should be decided as such." FRYE,
supra note 36, at 53,183.
104. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 7, at 25.
105. The "dead letter" characterization is that of Oscar Schachter, who acknowledges: "The
fact that Article 43 agreements have not been concluded and have not been found necessary
for military measures does not mean that the article is devoid of present interest." OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 394 (1991). He explains, how-
ever, by noting the "implication" of the article and its non-use to date "that member States
cannot be legally bound to provide armed forces unless they have agreed to do so." Id.
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"[a]ll Members" of the United Nations undertake to provide forces,
assistance, and facilities in accordance with special agreements nego-
tiated "as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. 10 6
The original expectation was that the five permanent members of the
Security Council would do so, both as valuable contributions in them-
selves and as examples to others. Ironically, when the subject of Ar-
ticle 43 agreements was revisited in the U.N. General Assembly dur-
ing the 1960s, the Soviet Union, otherwise ostensibly in favor of the
idea and also of breathing new life into the Military Staff Committee
which was asked to draft "the basic provisions of a model agree-
ment," argued that the resulting "force should not include contin-
gents from States which were permanent members of the Security
Council."' 7
Prominent among the other countries favoring the Article 43
concept at that time was Canada, which had led the successful effort
to establish UNEF during the Suez crisis and which, perhaps owing to
that nationally gratifying experience, advocated "the conclusion of
agreements under Article 43 of the Charter between the Security
Council and Member States for the provision of armed forces for
peace-keeping." The Canadian representative conceived "the peace-
keeping capacity of the United Nations in the broadest sense." Like
others, he did not consider the idea of "a permanent United Nations
force" to be realistic, and he did not favor it. Instead, he encouraged
member states "to earmark forces or police units or services and fa-
cilities which could be made available to the United Nations if a re-
quest were made and if the Government concerned agreed." 11
0
Canada continues to be an active proponent of specially trained,
broadly capable forces for possible U.N. operations. It therefore
would today be a logical candidate to be the first U.N. member coun-
try to conclude a special agreement with the Security Council. Con-
ceivably other countries, such as the Netherlands, which is Canada's
co-leader among the "friends of rapid reaction" group of some
twenty-four nations from around the world, might follow."9 Such ac-
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, paras. 1, 3.
107. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their
Aspects, U.N. GAOR, Special Comm. on Peace-keeping Operations, 5th Special Sess., Annex
1, Agenda Item 8, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/6654 (1967).
108. Id. at 18.
109. The other members of the "friends of rapid reaction" group, which do not expressly
represent regions and presumably are willing to be of service anywhere, are Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Bangladesh, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Senegal, South Korea, Sweden,
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tion could start a trend, particularly if, especially for the developing
countries on the "friends" list, various inducements of a financial or
other material kind were added to facilitate the conclusion of Article
43 negotiations with the Security Council.
What should be the form of agreements between individual U.N.
member states, or even groups of such states, and the United Na-
tions? Some guidance may be found in the text of a Model Agree-
ment with Troop Contributing Countries provided to the General
Assembly by the Secretariat in 1991.11 This document, no doubt re-
flecting Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's perspective and prefer-
ences, affirms "the international nature" of U.N. peacekeeping op-
erations. It specifies that the personnel made available "shall remain
in their national service but shall be under the command of the
United Nations..1 . In practice, however, as a member of the U.N.'s
Department of Peace-keeping Operations later noted with particular
reference to operations in Bosnia, "the Secretariat has tended to
leave command in the hands of commanders in the field, providing
guidance of a primarily political nature." He added that the United
Nations and NATO "found much common ground, in particular
through a 'dual key' arrangement in which both organizations must
grant prior approval for specific actions....
The awkwardness of the dual-key command procedure has be-
come a strong argument in favor of the even greater
"multinationalization" of U.N. peace operations. Perhaps this has
now been carried to an excess. The problem of finding the right le-
gal-political formulation and operational regime for gearing the ma-
jor global and regional security organizations to each other is no
doubt difficult, but it cannot be impossible to solve. How such a rap-
prochement of institutions might begin to be achieved, in specific
terms, was suggested by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering when
serving as U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations in
Ukraine, and Zambia. Barbara Crossette, At the U.N.: A Proposal To Speed Aid During Crisis,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1996, § 1, at 9. The group's specific proposal, not to be confused with
"stand-by arrangements" for providing national military assets for immediate use in more ur-
gent peace-maintenance situations, is to set up a stand-by field headquarters at the U.N.'s New
York headquarters which could be deployed at short notice to countries where missions are
approved by the Council.
110. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their
Aspects, Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Per-
sonnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary
General, U.N. GOAR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 74, U.N. Doc. A/461185 (1991).
111. Id. at 3.
112. Tharoor, supra note 69, at 128-129.
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1991 following the Persian Gulf War.11 3 Speaking personally, Picker-
ing speculated that the size of the U.N.'s security role in the future,
would depend on how the two key elements of "legitimacy"-the
need for international political approval as well as legal justification
for forcible action-and "flexibility"-the need for independence of
judgment in exercising military command responsibility-were inter-
related:
For military actions comparable in scale to Desert Storm, there
does not seem an obvious answer to this problem since a greater
degree of UN direction and control could have imposed disabling
constraints. On the other hand, we hope and believe that the scale
of Iraq-Kuwait is unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, Council cohesion nurtured by the Iraq experience could
carry over to other issues. If this proves true, there may be pressure
for enhancing the Security Council's role in future peace enforce-
ment and this should be considered.1
Pickering then proposed: "One way the Charter offers to do that
is by negotiation of Article 43 agreements between the Security
Council and countries it selects." His own reading of Article 43 sug-
gested a number of "relevant points." In the context of the present
argument, these merit full recounting:
First, the conclusion of such an agreement need not confer an
automatic, mandatory obligation to provide troops to the Security
Council, but could instead simply state their availability subject to
certain terms or procedures.
Second, Article 43 is silent on command arrangements: the
phrase "on its call" does not necessarily mean "at its direction."
Third, by specifying "assistance and facilities" the language
permits members to satisfy their obligations by means other than
provision of combat troops-a useful flexibility.
Fourth, Paragraph 3 specifies that agreements shall be at the
initiative of the Security Council, a helpful limiting factor that en-
sures selectivity.
Finally, Paragraph 3 also states that agreements may be be-
tween the Council and individual members or groups of members,
113. See Thomas R. Pickering, The U.N. Contribution to Future International Security,
Personal Remarks at the Conference on Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection,
sponsored by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the United States Marine Corps
University, Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 20-21, 1991) (text on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law).
114. Id. at 11.
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offering a potential basis for associations between the Security
Council and regionally based alliances. Since alliances offer a more
functional basis for concerted military action than a chance 5group-
ing of UN member states, this too could be a useful feature.
1
Such a conception of a possible "allied" relationship between the
United Nations and the "regionally based" North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has potential practical merit, as well as theoretical in-
terest, as a further way of, finally, closing the Cold War era. This
would be an indirect benefit. An Article 43-bonded relationship be-
tween the United Nations and NATO members could have some ef-
fect in reducing the anxiety of Russians about the future expansion of
the Atlantic Alliance, whose future conduct they may feel they have
more influence over if they can discuss the use of NATO members'
Article 43-provided assets in the U.N. Security Council. This could
be a diplomatically useful supplement to any direct "Charter" that
might be negotiated between the North Atlantic Alliance and the
Russian Federation. It derives from the established United Nations
Charter, a historically grounded treaty commitment.
At present, between NATO and the United Nations there exists
nothing more than an informal "liaison" relationship."6 It may even
go too far to term it a relationship, given the extraordinary caution
with which institutional contact is being made."7 However, even such
115. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in the original). The question naturally arises whether "groups
of states" if formed into regionally based alliances having organizational structures and repre-
sentative officials (e.g., NATO today) could themselves enter into Article 43 special agree-
ments with the U.N. Security Council. On this basic legal issue Hans Kelsen is instructive, em-
phasizing that if a "group" of members is to be a contracting party to an agreement with the
United Nations Organization, it must be "a juristic person". KELSEN, supra note 22, at 754.
"But this is possible only if it is an organised group endowed with an organ competent to repre-
sent the 'group' in relation to other persons of international law." Id. By this strict standard,
NATO would fail. One can imagine, however, NATO's Secretary General and the North At-
lantic Council, together, designing a common "framework" for individual NATO allies' paral-
lel agreements with the United Nations, and even conducting informal talks with U.N. Secre-
tariat officials and Security Council members concerning Article 43.
116. See Liaison with United Nations, Memorandum from Lieutenant General, CAAR, Di-
rector, IMS, for all Assistant Directors, IMS Chief of Staff, SHAPE, Doc. PO(93)85(2d Revise)
(July 14, 1993) (copy on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law),
("setting out the administrative procedures for NATO Headquarters Liaison Officer to the
United Nations (UNLO) programme in the form of an interim Terms of Reference."). The
document adds, lucidly and with precision: "This memorandum and the enclosed TOR are
strictly administrative in nature, and therefore are not to be, indeed, must not be, construed or
interpreted, in any sense, as an instrument, or part of a process, to formalize what is an infor-
mal, ad hoc, arrangement that facilitates the interchange of information between NATO and
the UN."
117. See id.
"KING LINKS" OF A "GLOBAL CHAIN"
a non-binding association, intended mainly for the exchange of in-
formation, has an unprecedented explicitness. Such articulation
eases communication and promotes familiarization. The NATO
practice of rotating its U.N. Liaison Officers in New York approxi-
mately every two weeks is introducing an increasingly large number
of officers to the mores of the world body.
A somewhat more basic and even "linked" relationship between
the two organizations is now developing. They increasingly rely on
each other-the United Nations on NATO's potency, and NATO on
the U.N.'s authority. In the field, as in Bosnia, the two organizations
are in close contact. At the highest institutional level, that of the Sec-
retaries-General, there is increased communication and even some
consultation, if still rather stiff and formalized. NATO's Secretary-
General, Dr. Javier Solana, regularly reported to Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali, and through him to the Security Council, regarding
the work of IFOR in implementation of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment.'18 Despite this appearance of hierarchical subordination in the
reportage relationship, the two organizations' chief servants are func-
tioning more or less as equal partners in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in the Balkan region. Regional organiza-
tions, including alliances like NATO and conceivably even the CIS,
can best work together on a kind of collegial basis, as "fellow" or-
ganizations. 9
Nonetheless, as this Article contends, there is reason to consider
fashioning a more structured relationship between the world organi-
zation and the world's leading regional alliance and, by extension,
other regional arrangements and agencies as well. Besides NATO
and the CIS, the Arab League, OAS, OAU, and others deserve to be
mentioned. The trend toward multinationalism, as against multilat-
eralism, in peace maintenance can go too far. Through the logic and
politics of inter-regional reciprocity, as noted with regard to Haiti
and Nagorno-Karabakh, some limited international restraint can be
exercised over great-power actions in particular geographic areas,
118. See, e.g., Letter from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President of
the Security Council (June 21, 1996), U.N. Doe. S/1996/465 (1996), conveying a letter of the
same date from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which be-
gins: "In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995), I attach the seventh report
of the operations of the multinational implementation force (IFOR). I would appreciate your
making this report available to the Security Council." Id.
119. Remarks by General John R. Galvin, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, at
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. (Sept. 16, 1992)
(characterizing the relationship between NATO and the U.N. during the Persian Gulf conflict).
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otherwise perhaps likely to become outright spheres of influence.
Such informal inhibition is not enough, however. Article 43, as has
been suggested, provides one way of more tightly tying in power
pacts to central authority, thereby enhancing the role of the U.N. Se-
curity Council, without depriving great powers and alliance systems
of their freedom to act independently, under Article 51, if and as
necessary. NATO and the other regional "king-links," as Senator
Vandenberg called them, need to be better welded into the "global
chain."1'2 Otherwise, regionally based arrangements for peace and
security could become iron spheres of local dominance, not golden
circles of a more enlightened world order.
120. THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG, supra note 2, at 337,366.
